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Extradition – Three Sheriff Court Cases 
Dr Paul Arnell 
A trio of sheriff court extradition cases decided at the end of 2017 illustrate the 
continuing development of the law and the inherent tensions cases face. The law 
continues to develop due to novel issues coming to the fore and the relative 
dearth of extradition-specific rules of procedure and evidence. The tensions 
simply arise from transnational justice being conditioned by antipathetic factors, 
including the protection of the human rights of requested persons.   
The first of these cases is Lord Advocate v SN, [2017] SC EDIN 69 (23 Oct.). At 
issue was the question of whether an arrest warrant should be granted following 
an extradition request where the requested person was suffering from dementia 
and other health issues. The requested person, the so-called ‘tartan terrorist’, 
had previously been extradited from Ireland to Scotland, but was then 
considered to be unfit to stand trial. Giving rise to the present case was a US 
request based on the accusation that he was responsible for making more than 
40 bomb threats in relation to US targets. The request was certified by a 
Scottish Minister in January 2016. Following the request an up-to-date report on 
SN’s health had been obtained by his solicitor. It confirmed that he was not fit to 
travel to the US, nor to stand trial. It also found that those facts were not 
temporary. The issue facing Sheriff Crowe was whether to exercise discretion 
and not issue an arrest warrant under s 71(2) of the Extradition Act 2003. That 
section provides that the judge may issue a warrant for the arrest of requested 
person if there are reasonable grounds for believing, inter alia, that the 
information provided is information that would justify the issue of a warrant for 
the arrest of a person accused of the offence within the judge's jurisdiction. The 
sheriff held that it was proper to exercise discretion under the statute and at 
common law and not issue a warrant for the arrest of SN. To grant the warrant, 
he held, would have been to authorise a charade, paying lip service to the 
procedural provisions of the 2003 Act, in the absence of SN, well knowing that it 
would be unjust and oppressive to extradite him (at para 18). SN was 
discharged from the process.  
In coming to his decision the sheriff noted that neither party was able to produce 
authority dealing with the discretion under section 71(2). Sheriff Crowe himself 
referred to Edwards v US [2012] EWHC 3771 (Admin), which whilst concerning 
discretion was not directly on point in that the discretion considered was that of 
the Secretary of State issuing a certificate, not an extradition judge granting an 
arrest warrant. As such, Lord Advocate v SN appears to deal with a novel point. 
Section 71(2) allows discretion in issuing a warrant, and in the case it was 
wholly reasonably exercised. Of note here is the origin of the request being the 
US, a category 2 country. This is relevant because the issuance of a certificate at 
the start of the process in such cases is not qualified by a belief by the Scottish 
Ministers that the extradition is proportionate – as it is for category 1 requests 
under s 2(7A) of the 2003 Act. Had the request emanated from an EU member 
state the sheriff may well have not been faced with the case.  
The second recent case is Lord Advocate v Shapovalov [2017] SC EDIN 83 (29 
Nov.). Here the possible applicability in extradition hearings of statements of 
uncontroversial evidence (SUEs) under s 258 of the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995 was at issue.  SUEs allow a party to criminal proceedings to 
identify facts which are unlikely to be disputed and to serve them on the other 
party. Section 258 also creates a procedure under which SUEs can be 
challenged. In Shapovalov the requested person lodged two SUEs inter alia 
stating that he would be detained in non-article 3 compliant conditions in Russia 
if extradited. The Lord Advocate challenged the competency of s 258 in 
extradition as well as the facts specified within the SUEs. In doing so he referred 
to Kapri v HMA [2014] HCJAC 33 and stated “The clear thrust of Kapri is that the 
default position is that the rules of criminal evidence are applicable. The 
exception is where there are special circumstances” (at para 13). There were 
special circumstances, he argued, in the form of s 77(2) of the 2003 Act (which 
referred to powers of the judge not a party to serve notice) and s 258 of the 
1995 Act (alluding to a preliminary hearing, intermediate diet and trial diet). In 
response Sheriff Ross firstly held that as SUEs are part of the “‘normal rules’ of 
summary criminal proceedings… unless they conflict or are irreconcilable with 
the provisions of sec 77, they form part of extradition procedure” (at para 19). 
Secondly, the sheriff rejected the argument based on the timetable in s 258 
because, in his view, it took an “unduly narrow approach to found on the specific 
terminology, and such an approach runs contrary to the inclusive language of 
the authorities relied upon” (at para 25). ‘Special circumstances’, the sheriff 
held, referred to “… surrounding facts. Drafting or terminology issues are not 
‘circumstances’” (at para 25). The sheriff held that s 258 did apply to extradition 
hearings, but rejected Shapovalov’s application to disregard the challenge to 
them.  
Interestingly, Lord Advocate v Shapovalov was distinguished from HMA v 
Havrilova [2011] HCJAC 113, where an attempt to incorporate a feature of 
criminal procedure into extradition proceedings was rejected. In HMA v Havrilova 
the High Court held that it was not possible to accommodate the custody time 
limits under s 147(1) of the 1995 Act into the structure of the 2003 Act. Sheriff 
Ross distinguished the case by the fact that in HMA v Havrilova the appellant 
was attempting to invoke rights which only come into existence following being 
charged with a summary offence. There was also, he noted, express provision on 
bail in extradition proceedings. Undoubtedly, the acceptance of the competency 
of SUEs in extradition hearings is novel. The rationale for it was the efficient 
leading of evidence which was, the sheriff noted, “every bit as central to 
extradition proceedings as it is to summary, and for that matter all, criminal 
procedure” (at para 20). Of course it remains to be seen whether and to what 
extent SUEs are utilised within extradition proceedings.  
Lord Advocate v Black, [2017] SC EDIN 77 (17 Nov. 2017), the third recent 
case, was spawned by a request from the United Arab Emirates. Here Black was 
sought to serve a 12 month sentence following his conviction for crimes 
including embezzlement from the bank account of his Dubai-based employer. He 
had been living and working in Dubai at the relevant time. He was convicted in 
absentia, having returned to Scotland. Two of the four grounds in opposition to 
extradition were upheld by Sheriff Welsh. The first followed from Black being 
convicted in absentia. As he had not deliberately absented himself from the UAE 
proceedings the sheriff was obliged to decide whether he would be entitled to a 
retrial or (on appeal) a review amounting to a retrial, under s 85(5). An aspect 
of this requirement includes the provision of legal aid. As the UAE did not have a 
system of legal aid the condition was not met. Black was discharged for this 
reason under s 85(7). Although discharged, the sheriff went on to consider the 
human rights compatibility of Black’s extradition. Upon reviewing the oral 
evidence the sheriff held that there substantial grounds for believing Black would 
be at real risk of an article 3 violation because of the inadequate medical 
provision at Bur Dubai Police station. A further factor was that the son-in-law of 
Black was well-connected in the UAE and he might apply pressure in order to 
secure the return of his estranged wife to Dubai. Again referring to the lack of 
legal aid, the sheriff also held that there was a real risk of a violation of article 6 
if Black was extradited to Dubai in that he would be tried in Arabic which he 
could not speak. Black was therefore discharged under both ss 85(5) and 87(2).  
As with Lord Advocate v Shapovalov evidential questions arose in Lord Advocate 
v Black. Unlike the former, though, the questions were evidentially orthodox – 
namely the possible admission of a document prepared several years previously 
for a distinct case and the status of a particular witness as an expert. After 
considering s 202 of the 2003 Act governing receivable documents and judicial 
dicta, including Kapri v HMA, the sheriff held that the document was 
inadmissible. He held that it would be unfair to admit it and treat its contents as 
evidence without the respondent having an opportunity to test it in cross 
examination. Sheriff Welsh did accept the expert witness put forward by Black. 
In doing so, however, he noted that her opinion was not sufficient to determine 
the ultimate issue – which here was whether there were substantial grounds for 
believing there would be a real risk that Black will be subjected to human rights 
violations in the UAE.  
Each of the three recent sheriff court extradition cases is notable in its own right. 
Jointly, they demonstrate that extradition law continues to develop and that 
tensions in the law itself and in its application persist. The development is in the 
rules of procedure and evidence. The provision in the 2003 Act relating to 
evidence is limited and the effect of granting an extradition judge the same 
powers as nearly as may be as if the proceedings were summary proceedings is 
at times unclear. There is not a hybrid code of extradition procedure and 
evidence – as noted by the Lord Justice Clerk in Kapri v HMA (at para 126). 
Courts have been obliged to rely on summary cause rules and respond to 
arguments made and evidence put forward by parties to hearings. This has 
exposed various tensions. Lord Advocate v Black also demonstrates the inherent 
conflicts within extradition including that between the interests of the requesting 
state and the human rights of the individual subjected to the process. 
 
